Κατά την τελευταία δεκαετία διεξάγεται μεγάλη συζήτηση γιά τον ρόλο της τηλεοράσεως στην διαμόρφωση και υλοποίηση της εξωτερικής πολιτικής των κρατών. Ορισμένοι υποστηρίζουν ότι η τηλεόραση αποτελεί έναν πανίσχυρο μηχανισμό, ο οποίος δύναται να υπαγορεύει το περιεχόμενο των πολιτικών αποφάσεων, ενώ άλλοι τάσσονται υπέρ της θέσεως ότι η τηλεόραση αποτελεί μία ακόμη μεταβλητή, την οποία πρέπει να λαμβάνουν υπ' όψιν τους οι κυβερνήσεις κατά την άσκηση της εξωτερικής πολιτικής.

ATHENS 2003

Περίληψη

Κατά την τελευταία δεκαετία διεξάγεται μεγάλη συζήτηση γιά τον ρόλο της τηλεοράσεως στην διαμόρφωση και υλοποίηση της εξωτερικής πολιτικής των κρατών. Ορισμένοι υποστηρίζουν ότι η τηλεόραση αποτελεί έναν πανίσχυρο μηχανισμό, ο οποίος δύναται να υπαγορεύει το περιεχόμενο των πολιτικών αποφάσεων, ενώ άλλοι τάσσονται υπέρ της θέσεως ότι η τηλεόραση αποτελεί μία ακόμη μεταβλητή, την οποία πρέπει να λαμβάνουν υπ' όψιν τους οι κυβερνήσεις κατά την άσκηση της εξωτερικής πολιτικής.

Στην παρούσα μελέτη θα καταδειχθεί ότι η τηλεόραση αποτελεί απλώς ένα μέσο ασκήσεως εξωτερικής πολιτικής και όχι τον φορέα αυτής. Σε περίπτωση,όμως, ανεπαρκείας μιάς κυβερνήσεως να επιτύχει την ικανοποίηση του εθνικού συμφέροντος η τηλεόραση ενδέχεται να αναλάβει τα ηνία με ό,τι κινδύνους μπορεί να συνεπάγεται αυτό.

Abstract

During the last decade the role played by television in the design and implementation of state foreign policy has been largely discussed. Some argue that television is an all-powerful mechanism, able to dictate the content of political decisions, while others regard television as one more variable that governments should take into account when exercising foreign policy.

It will be shown in this study that television is just a means in the exercise of foreign policy and not a main actor. However, when a government proves incompetent in meeting national interests, television may take the reins, whatever risks this implies.

• 1. Foreign policy and Mass Media

After the end of World War II and especially during the last three decades, the international environment has undergone important changes due to technological advances and the ensuing development of transport and communication. Technological advances in the way information is produced, absorbed and managed, have led to important changes in the way in which governments design and implement their foreign policy.[1] Lawrence Freedman pointed out some years ago that «if knowledge is power then diffusion of knowledge must result in a diffusion of power and the control of this process is, in itself, a form of power».[2] This implies that information management has already become a constituent element of power. Moreover, power is a means for serving each state's national interest.

At that point the role of the Mass Media is decisive, as they are the means that collects, processes and transmits lots of information to broad masses of peoples. It is understandable why governments, when exercising their foreign policy, try to find ways of approaching the Mass Media, both to get information from it but also provide it with information which, when transmitted to a broad public, contributes in shaping and establishing the desired image of the state, thus favouring national interest.[3] In turn, the Mass Media have every reason to approach governments, because the latter constitute an important source of information concerning their choices on matters of foreign policy.

Some writers argue that, as to matters of foreign policy, the governments are the sole main source of information for the Mass Media, and thus the latter are subject to the absolute control of the former.[4] Therefore, the content of foreign news reports broadcast by Mass Media is to a large extent controlled by the governments of either liberal and democratic or authoritarian states. The difference between democratic and authoritarian states lies in that the governments of the former exert an indirect control upon the Mass Media, while the governments of the latter exert a direct one.[5]

Furthermore, the Mass Media tend to facilitate and support the implementation of their states' governmental choices in matters of foreign policy, as their owners but also some of their cadre are members of the social elite and share the same ideological conceptions and preconceptions concerning national interest with the members of their governments.[6]

To a certain extent the above observations do match reality! It is true that governments control a wide range of matters concerning their states' international relations, and moreover have sources of information available, not accessible to everyone.[7] They are also institutionally in charge of deciding on the relevant issues and therefore bear the responsibility of their choices. Thus, they consider the Mass Media as one more tool, which they can use either to get information when this is not feasible from other sources or to exert influence upon domestic public opinion or upon international public opinion or upon other governments.[8]

Yet it is also true that time and again the Mass Media, exercising their own role of control, become extremely critical of the governments if the latter's political choices are proven incorrect after the event.[9] In this case they influence public opinion negatively, the result being that any popular legitimising support for those choices is annulled.[10] Moreover, the Mass Media can easily focus the attention of public opinion to particular matters of foreign policy ignoring others, thus sometimes obliging governments to revise their agenda accordingly. In this sense the Mass Media do not of course define the content of the governments' foreign policy, but they can define priorities.[11] Finally it is a fact that, as far as time is concerned, they usually are the first source of information for both governments and the public opinion about events around the world. This is why governments are many times obliged, under the pressure of the time factor, to take a stand on issues which are not of immediate priority as far as their national interests are concerned, and about which they perhaps do not have adequate information.[12]

From the above it is clear that there is a form of interaction between the governments and the Mass Media in the process of the design and implementation of foreign policy.[13] However, this does not mean that the Mass Media are co-responsible with governments in dealing with matters of foreign policy. They simply seem to exert a kind of limited influence upon them.

At any rate, the final responsibility as to the choices concerning the exercise of foreign policy institutionally always rests with the governments and not with the Mass Media and this is something that neither political leaders nor diplomats, owners and the cadre working in the Mass Media should forget.

Taking all that into account, we will now move on to examine the role that television plays when governments shape and exercise their foreign policy, as it has been clear since the first Gulf War that television has some specific features which make it an important mechanism in influencing international public opinion.

• 2. Foreign policy and television

In 1957, Nikita Khrushchev gave an interview to the American TV network CBS in which he stated his plans for a model of peaceful competition between the two great powers.[14] This interview caused much trouble for American officials who thought that the Soviet leader, using television to address the American public, inaugurated a new form of propaganda. The worst thing was that they could not apply the same method to address the Soviet public, because back at that time neither the technical possibilities existed for them to get round the relevant restrictions and prohibitions of the Soviet state, nor was television a wide-spread means of communication in that country.

Furthermore, with the launching of Sputnik the very same year and the beginning of the «space race», new perspectives emerged for the development of international reporting having much wider implications than were initially suggested by broadcasts of the Tokyo 1964 Olympic Games to the international TV audience.[15]

Thus, a few years later television reports from South-East Asia made the Vietnam War the first war which the American and international TV public followed from their living rooms.[16] Marshall Mc Luhan's Global Village was becoming a reality. Henry Kissinger stressed the importance of TV as an element of international politics when, commenting on that turbulent period, he claimed that:

«Television was just then coming into its own. The regular evening broadcasts were attracting audiences in the tens of millions, far more people than even the most popular print journalists could hope to reach in a lifetime. And they possessed the advantage of visual images to provide a running editorial commentary. The newscasts reflected a craving for drama and showmanship that, even with the best of intentions, could not always be balanced, if only because it was technically impossible to cover the atrocities the Vietcong were committing in areas under their control. The news anchor turned into a political figure, in the sense that only a president could have reached as many people - and certainly not with such regularity».[17]

The failure of the US military operations in Vietnam was largely attributed to the negative impact on the American public of TV broadcasts of scenes of brutal violence from the battlefields combined with the mounting number of casualties. As a result, all legitimising popular support in favour of the American government's continued operations vanished.[18] However, various studies have shown that the reason why popular support gradually disappeared was not television but the fact that American governments proved unable to achieve tangible results in a short period of time.[19] Television just expressed popular discontent and accelerated the final withdrawal of American troops from Saigon.

Almost two decades later, i.e. in 1989 and 1990, the downfall of the Eastern European communist regimes was connected to the positive role television may play in shaping international relations but also to the improvement of the living standards of the world population.[20] The idea was put forward that television images from the West became the catalyst for peoples of the Eastern block to put on pressure, demanding changes, while at the same time using television to win the support of public opinion in Western countries.[21]

Then, during the first Gulf War, television became an important tool through which USA President George Bush and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein exchanged, within minutes or hours, all sorts of messages, while at the same time they tried to influence both their domestic and international public opinion in favour of their positions.[22] The diplomatic preparations as well as the armed conflict unravelled on TV screens before the eyes of international audiences.

At that point, the role of CNN proved decisive, but not in the way its people thought it would. The day before the bombing began, Ted Turner stressed the network's importance to his Baghdad producer, Robert Wiener, with these words:

«We are a global network. If there's a chance for peace ... it might come through us. Hell, both sides aren't talking to each other, but they are talking to CNN. We have a major responsibility».[23] 

Behind this dramatic statement there was a more prosaic reality. The globally known network, having an obvious commercial interest, spent huge sums of money to broadcast live all over the world reports from Baghdad and from the front of the war operations.[24]

Often, the images broadcast reminded one of video game scenes, as both the governments of the countries involved and the TV network itself - each for its own reasons - wanted to emphasise the technological dimension of the war. TV ratings were so high, that CNN finally succeeded in balancing the huge expenditure required for such extensive TV coverage of the events.[25] Without a doubt the whole CNN coverage of the war was a financial, commercial, technological, communicative and journalistic achievement. However, by no means did it gave peace a chance! This is due to the inherent interest of the medium (see television) in covering dramatic events and due to the anarchic nature of international system and international politics.[26] CNN was not in a position to do anything for peace simply because the conflicting parties had not the will to defuse the crisis. The truth is that the role of CNN was one of a legitimising or de-legitimising factor for the political choices of both sides. Each party had to persuade international public opinion for the right of its cause using the possibilities offered by new technologies and especially by this particular American media colossus. Irrespective of which party had won this game of legitimisation, the outcome would have been the same, namely war!  CNN could not have been a peace catalyst. That was so because neither the USA nor Iraq intended to step back from their positions and interests.   

  Having this in mind, one should see CNN's role in that war in its right dimensions. It is indicative that according to relevant surveys, 61 percent of the American public considered CNN the most reliable television network, while, already since the 1980s, 51 percent considered television the most reliable means of mass information.[27] It is notable that since the early 1960's television news has surpassed newspapers as the American public's main source of information and has become an even more important source in following decades, particularly for foreign affairs news.[28] Similar findings of relevant surveys - if any - concerning other parts of the globe, would not have been a surprise, given that during the last thirteen years CNN has, on the one hand, been a member of a strict club of global news networks and, on the other hand, the whole world has been watching the whole world through the services offered by this club. According to BBC estimates, during the period 1965-1990, the number of television-sets worldwide had grown from 180 million to more than a billion. In 1965, 80 percent of the TV-receivers were located in North America and Europe. By 1990, only 55 percent of the much larger number was.[29] This means that since 1990 more and more people from every part of the world have had «their own» window to international events. 

It is generally acknowledged that in the first Gulf War both the American government and the American military leadership were able to fully control TV broadcasts of military operations and political messages.[30] Thus they succeeded in limiting any reservations the American public might have and minimise any desire for expressing disagreement.[31] In addition, they managed to effectively promote their aims and legitimise internationally their political and military choices.[32] This was combined with very good planning on the military level, so that the best possible results could be achieved in the shortest possible period of time and with the fewest possible casualties. The American leadership did not forget the lessons of Vietnam.[33] Later, the same model was also used in Bosnia, where television presented to the international public the image each side of the conflict desired.[34]

Recently, the international community faced a new military conflict between a coalition under the leadership of the USA on the one hand and Iraq on the other. Television once again was called to play its role as a global communicator as well as a legitimising or de-legitimising factor. Moreover, this time it became a more important diplomatic tool than it had been in the past, due to the specific aspects of this particular situation. The juxtaposition between the aforementioned adversaries was not a simple argument among some states; it had far more serious implications for the shape of the international system in the coming decades. All the great, medium and small powers of the world as well as major international organisations were concerned. The international community and international public had a great interest in following the events, because there were indications that the post World War II status quo was at stake. That is why television was about to play an important role this time.

New elements, which confirm the above, were the following: a) live TV broadcasts from the United Nations Security Council, the British House of Commons and other multilateral forums' open sessions concerning the then ongoing crisis, b) TV coverage of global massive anti-war demonstrations, c) televised declarations and ultimatums coming from political leaders and resignations of ministers, d) interviews with mainly American and secondly Iraqi soldiers and officers on the field before, during and after the fight and e) existence of CNN's important Arab competitors like Al Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV.

The facts in all these cases proved that the best result for each concerned party was feasible just through the combination of a) best-clarified foreign policy aims, b) effective use of force and c) utilization of the best possible quantitative and qualitative means to influence international public opinion. This confirms two things: a) the axiom that the most powerful and, finally, victorious side in a war imposes de facto the legitimization of its cause, b) the principle that Public, Communication and Mass Media Diplomacy should always be a sequel and cannot be the leader of a good foreign policy. Of course, television is on the edge of these considerations due to its own characteristics. 

So, according to Eytan Gilboa, the characteristics which best describe global television news coverage are the following:

 «1) It is broadcast around the clock 24 hours a day, 2) it is transmitted in real-time, 3) it is broadcast from every place in the world to every other place, 4) it is headline dominated and 5) it is live event-oriented».[35]

There are also two significant formats, namely the breaking news and the continuing crisis coverage, which create pressure a) for editors to push reporters to broadcast new pictures, b) for reporters to push political leaders to respond fast to unfolding events and c) for leaders to push experts and diplomats to produce instant policy analysis and recommendations.[36]

From the study of the aforementioned cases and taking into account the thesis of Eytan Gilboa, certain findings arise concerning the nature of television and its relation to state foreign policy. It has become obvious that television is by nature an instrument simplifying the reality of a complex world.[37] Television cannot possibly include events in a coherent framework and analyse them by presenting the relevant background. It is a picture-driven medium requiring certain preconditions for it to operate effectively. For example the final outcome of TV broadcasting depends on the presence of the camera operator at the right time in the right place to capture the right sort of events. Whatever happens behind the operator's back or when the camera is turned off does not constitute part of the visual record. Furthermore, the pictures sent in by the reporters in the field can be synthesized in the editorial rooms and re-ordered with a new commentary to become more "comprehensible". In addition, speed is what prevails in TV broadcasts and of course this is incompatible with any detailed analysis. What counts is not the context of an issue and the deep analysis of the latter but the dramatic character of distorted images. This element may help a government impose a particular perspective of the foreign policy it follows, but it may also be disastrous if the government has to take decisions under the pressure of public opinion eventually influenced by a distorted television image. Political leaders often face a difficult dilemma: if they respond immediately to the pressures of public opinion, they may make a mistake; if they ask for more time to think, they may create the impression of confusion or of losing control over events. They usually prefer to provide some response rather than asking for additional time.[38] However, no political leader or diplomat or expert in international relations admits to feeling forced to follow a particular policy called for by the media or implied by coverage.[39] Usually governments appear to react to TV messages while quietly adhering to the continuum of a cold and rational policy.[40] And as for the time pressure, some argue that it is difficult to clearly correlate good decisions with the length of time available for policymaking.[41] Nevertheless, Collin Powell observed that "live television coverage doesn't change the policy, but it does create the environment in which the policy is made".[42]

It is commonly agreed that discontinuity and fragmentariness characterise television as to the coverage of international relations.[43] Television shows a preference for dramatic events, such as war conflicts, Summits and international crises. On the contrary, it pays no attention to very important events of no dramatic character and thus for international public opinion also these same events pass unnoticed.[44] So, if a government drifts along influenced by the agenda of television, it may neglect issues that are more vital than those capturing public opinion. It is possible, however, that governments dictate or influence the agenda of television, or that the latter just serves the governments' objectives.

Finally, research has shown that special emphasis is placed on matters concerning the USA, Europe, Russia and the Middle East, while matters concerning Africa, Australia, the Far-East, etc. are virtually absent from TV networks.[45] This is due to the fact that, within the international system, the interests of the powerful states are mainly at stake in the former areas and not in the latter.

In any case, comparison between television coverage of the Vietnam War and the Gulf Wars relevant to the policy followed by the then American governments is a typical example proving what many analysts have supported.[46] Governments are responsible for the design and implementation of a state's foreign policy and therefore they can easily use television as one more tool in order to serve national interest. However, in cases where foreign policy fails, the means, that is television, tends to substitute the government and this of course involves the risk of multiplying failure, given its incoherent and fragmented character.[47]    

• 3. Conclusions

From the former analysis the following conclusions are drawn: a) in our era of globalised communications, information management is a form of power, which governments cannot ignore, b) the Mass Media exert a limited influence upon governments in their exercise of foreign policy, c) the final responsibility for the design and implementation of foreign policy rests with the governments, although many international actors (the Mass Media included) try to exert influence upon them, d) television is an important tool for governments in exercising their foreign policy as far as it can promulgate their views and shape the attitudes of international audiences, e) governments and political leaders have to find ways to avoid immediate policy responses to unfolding events without being exposed as weak and confused, f) governments have to find ways to maintain policies that are at odds with prevailing television tone, without alienating public opinion, g) television tends to define foreign policy when governments prove unable to adequately fulfil their institutional role, thus accelerating the onset of the negative consequences of a bad policy.

References

TRANSLATIONS INTO GREEK

• Mc Nair Brian, Introduction to Political Communication, translated by Sofia Tsourvaka, Georgios Vayas, Konstantinos Koskinas, Athens: Katarti, 1998.

ENGLISH

• Fujita Hiroshi, «Television and Foreign Policy in the 1990s» in Japan Review of International Affairs, Volume 12, issue 2, Summer 1998, pp. 77-92
• Gergen David, «Diplomacy in a Television Age: The Dangers of a Teledemocracy» in The Media and Foreign Policy, Serfaty Simon (ed.), New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
• Gilboa Eytan, The Global News Networks and US Policymaking in Defence and Foreign Affairs, Boston: The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, 2002
• Gowing Nik, «Instant TV and Foreign Policy» in The World Today, October 1994, pp. 187-190
• Gowing Nik, «Real-time TV Coverage from War-Does it Make or Break Government Policy?» in Bosnia by Television, James Gow, Richard Paterson, Alison Preston (eds.), London: British Film Institute, 1996.
• Graber A. Doris, Mass Media and American Politics, Washington D.C: CQ Press, 1989.
• Herman Edward-Chomsky Noam, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, New York: Pantheon Books, 2002
• Kissinger Henry, Diplomacy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994
• Malek Abbas-Wiegand E. Krista, «News Media and Foreign Policy: an Integrated Review» in News Media and Foreign Relations - A Multifaceted Perspective, Malek Abbas (ed.), Norwood-New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1998.
• McNulty Timothy, «Television's Impact on Executive Decisionmaking and Diplomacy» in The Fletcher Forum, Winter 1993, pp. 67-83
• Morgenthau Hans, Politics among Nations, brief edition revised by Kenneth Thompson, Boston - New York: McGraw Hill, 1993.
• Mowlana Hamid, «The Media and Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis» in News Media and Foreign Relations - A Multifaceted Perspective, Malek Abbas (ed.), Norwood-New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1998.
• Seaver Brenda, «The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy» in Press/Politics, volume 3, issue 1, 1997, pp. 65 - 91
• Seib Philip, Headline Diplomacy - How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy, London: Praeger Publishers, 1997
• Serfaty Simon, «The Media and Foreign Policy» in The Media and Foreign Policy, Serfaty Simon (ed.), New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
• Strobel P. Warren, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997.
• Taylor M. Philip, Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945, London and New York: Routledge, 1997.
• Waltz Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts - Menlo Park, California - Don Mills, Ontario: Addison - Wesley Publishing Company, 1979

[1] Philip M. Taylor, Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945, London and New York, Routledge, 1997, p. 47, Hamid Mowlana, «The Media and Foreign Policy: a Framework of Analysis» in News Media and Foreign Relations - A Multifaceted Perspective, Malek Abbas (ed.), Norwood-New Jersey, Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1998, p. 33-35

[2]  Cited in Philip M. Taylor, op. cit., p. 88

[3] Philip M. Taylor, op. cit., p. 59, also Brian Mc Nair, Introduction to Political Communication, translated into Greek by Sofia Tsourvaka, Georgios Vayas, Konstantinos Koskinas, Athens: Katarti, 1998, p. 270.

[4] Abbas Malek-Krista E. Wiegand, «News Media and Foreign Policy: an Integrated Review» in News Media and Foreign Relations - A Multifaceted Perspective, Malek Abbas (ed.), Norwood-New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1998, p. 6.

[5] On the techniques of exerting control, Ibid, p. 9.

[6] Ibid, p. 6.

[7] Simon Serfaty, «The Media and Foreign Policy» in The Media and Foreign Policy, Serfaty Simon (ed.), New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, p. 4.

[8] Philip M. Taylor, op. cit., p. 59.

[9] Hamid Mowlana, op. cit., p. 32 and Simon Serfaty, op. cit., p. 4

[10] The case of the Vietnam War is indicative. See Brian Mc Nair, op. cit., p. 290 in combination with Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, brief edition revised by Kenneth Thompson, Boston-New York, McGraw Hill, 1993, pp. 7-8, Edward Herman-Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, New York, Pantheon Books, 2002, pp. 169 - 252 and David R. Gergen, «Diplomacy in a Television Age: The Dangers of a Teledemocracy» in The Media and Foreign Policy, Serfaty Simon (ed.), New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, p. 48.

[11] P. Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations, Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 60, as well as Abbas Malek-Krista Wiegand, op. cit., p. 18

[12] Warren P. Strobel, op. cit., p. 76, David R. Gergen, op. cit., p. 54 as well as Doris A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, Washington D.C. CQ Press, 1989, p. 364.

[13] Abbas Malek-Krista Wiegand, op. cit., p. 14.

[14] Philip M. Taylor, op. cit, p. 84

[15] Ibid

[16] David R. Gergen, op. cit., p. 48, Philip M. Taylor, op. cit., p. 84, Warren P. Strobel, op. cit., pp. 30-31

[17] Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994, pp. 667 - 668

[18] Warren P. Strobel, op. cit., p. 30

[19] Ibid together with Hans Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 7-8 and Edward Herman - Noam Chomsky, op. cit., pp. 169 - 252

[20] David R. Gergen, op. cit., p. 48

[21] Ibid.

[22] Warren P. Strobel, op. cit., p. 44, Eytan Gilboa, The Global News Networks and US Policymaking in Defence and Foreign Affairs, Boston, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, 2002, pp. 17 - 18

[23]  Cited in Philip Seib, Headline Diplomacy - How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy, London: Praeger Publishers, 1997, p. 108

[24] Warren p. Strobel, op. cit., p. 45

[25] Ibid

[26] There are three reasons for the anarchic character of the international system: a) it is not organised on commonly agreed normative principles, built on concentration of power and hierarchical distribution of competences, b) its elements (states) do not have functional diversification and c) the relations among its elements (states) are completely formulated according to their respective power. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts-Menlo Park, California-Don Mills, Ontario, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979, p. 89 next and 103 next

[27] Warren Strobel, op. cit., p. 45 as well as Philip M. Taylor, op. cit., p.85.

[28] Brenda Seaver, "The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy" in Press/Politics, Volume 3, issue 1, 1997, p. 68, Hiroshi Fujita, "Television and Foreign Policy in the 1990s" in Japan Review of International Affairs, Volume 12, issue 2, 1998, p. 78

[29] Philip Seib, op. cit., p. 107

[30] Nik Gowing, «Real-time TV Coverage from War - Does it Make or Break Government Policy?» in Bosnia by Television, James Gow, Richard Paterson, Alison Preston (eds.), London: British Film Institute, 1996, p. 81.

[31] Warren P. Strobel, op. cit., p.45.

[32] The invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent breach of International Law by the Iraqi government helped the US government to legitimise its political aims and military movements, even when the latter were exceeding International Law and Human Rights Law.

[33] Warren P. Strobel, op. cit., p. 42, Timothy McNulty, "Television's Impact on Executive Decisionmaking and Diplomacy" in The Fletcher Forum, Winter 1993, pp. 78-79

[34] Nik Gowing, op. cit., p. 81.

[35] Eytan Gilboa, op. cit., p. 6

[36] Ibid and Hiroshi Fujita, op. cit., p. 79

[37] David Gergen, op. cit., p.50.

[38] Eytan Gilboa, op. cit., p. 19

[39] Warren P. Strobel, op. cit., pp.  57 - 88, Philip M. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 94 - 98

[40] Nik Gowing, "Instant TV and Foreign Policy" in The World Today, October 1994, p. 187

[41] Eytan Gilboa, op. cit., p. 19

[42] Cited in Eytan Gilboa, op. cit., p. 10

[43] Philip M. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 88 - 94

[44] David Gergen, op. cit., p. 50

[45] Ibid

[46] Hans Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 7, Abbas Malek-Krista E. Wiegand, op. cit., p. 6., David Gergen, op. cit., p. 62.

[47] David Gergen, op. cit., p. 62, Eytan Gilboa, op. cit., p. 13, Hiroshi Fujita, op. cit., pp. 85-86. Ted Koppel, a veteran ABC correspondent, told in a testimony before the Congress: "Outside factors tend to influence the formation of foreign policy, to a greater or lesser degree, in almost direct proportion to the amount of credible information and policy direction that a government otherwise makes available. To the degree, in other words, that US foreign policy in a given region has been clearly stated and adequate, accurate information has been provided, the influence of television coverage diminishes proportionately. To state that premise in reverse, television's influence increases in regions where an administration has a) failed to enunciate a clear policy and/or b) has done little or nothing to inform the American public on the dangers of intervention or failing to intervene", cited in Warren P. Strobel, op. cit., p. 63